I take issue with retired Maj. Gen. Scales’ article, “The shape of brigades to come” [October]. Scales claims that Special Forces operations in Afghanistan and Northern Iraq, and the Stryker’s deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) somehow serve to “validate” retired Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czega’s aero-mechanized theories. This is an absurd assertion and bad history, at best. While air delivery of small teams of Special Forces and light infantry were the hallmark of both campaigns, in neither instance were large-scale mechanized forces involved. The performance of Stryker brigades in Iraq is certainly laudable; however, the “aero” part of the aero-mechanized maneuver theory was missing. Scales should weigh the evidence before making such outlandish statements as, “The challenge of future warfare on land cannot be met without building modular, FCS [Future Combat Systems]-equipped forces aero-mechanized brigades that will form the aerial blitzkrieg of the future.”

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/01/1302885

MAJ Klein said: "I take issue with retired Maj. Gen. Scales’ article, “The shape of brigades to come”……S.F. and light infantry were the hallmark of both campaigns, in neither instance were large-scale mechanized forces involved. The performance of Stryker bdes in Iraq is certainly laudable; however, the “aero” part of the aero-mech maneuver theory was missing. Scales should weigh the evidence before making such outlandish statements as, “The challenge of future warfare on land cannot be met without building modular, FCS-equipped forces aero-mech bdes that will form the aerial blitzkrieg of the future.”
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if air deployments to Afghanistan and Northern Iraq involved light infantry, special forces, and light Marine units, that does not mean future planners would be so limited in options. The 62 C-17 sorties that airlifted 173rd Airborne Brigade and a very small current armor contingent into Bashur, could in the future, include more armor in the form of both Strykers and FCS Manned Ground Vehicles.
-
The Joint Operational War Plans Division of the Pentagon must have believed that airlifting 17 C-17s of paratroopers was survivable on the first of its 5 nights of air deployments. In the future, FCS/Stryker armor and airborne/light infantry platoons could sit side-by-side on C-17s to rapidly airlift both kinds of forces. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) which lifts the equivalent of 16 C-17s at about the same cost as a single C-17, also opens the option of joint closure into a port using combined JHSV and C-17s.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJ Klein said: "Several Rand Corp. studies have concluded that there are serious issues of survivability against any enemy possessing even a modicum of air defense. Recently, in the Army’s own war game, Unified Quest 05, one FCS-equipped bde required 300 sorties per day over four days to complete a vertical envelopment with a loss of 10 aircraft (...). Could we really afford such losses in reality? Does one bde over four days represent “aerial blitzkrieg”? In the same war game, vertical envelopment in a low-altitude air-defense environment represented “high-risk operations” averaging 15 percent to 25 percent loss of airframes. These cheap, low-tech, easy to hide and non-emitting air defenses and small arms are precisely the types of threats the 11th AHR encountered in their aborted deep attack during OIF."
---------------------------------------------------------------------
I don't recall losing a single C-17 or C-130 that airlanded in Bashur or Afghanistan due to enemy fire. Marine V-22 also are available for more troublesome entries after joint forces and ELINT/ECM capabilities perform JSEAD minutes before entry. C-17s and C-130 are being equipped with Large Aircraft IR Countermeasure systems to thwart whatever few IR MANPAD missiles survive, and overhead F-35s with excellent optics should identify and silence any ground fire.
-
Is loss of 10 of 1200 aircraft unacceptable? Perhaps, but given that the USAF once lost about 1 out of 4 servicemen in WWII, and currently loses about 1 in 40 in OIF/OEF, I believe sufficient patriot Airmen and Soldiers would risk 1 in 120 losses to achieve the worthy goal of safeguarding closure of fellow Airmen and Soldiers.
-
You didn't mention what kind of air sorties were involved. By my count, a full FCS brigade would require fewer than 250 C-17 Sorties to close on an airhead…not 1200. And you guys in J-7 would certainly make a point of identifying which brigade elements were not essential to deploy. More rapid closure coupled with close support JSEAD could ensures that the enemy lacked time to reinforce and counterattack, until sufficient ground force was available to handle any such contingency. Counterattacking adversaries, who were previously hidden, once moving would expose themselves to ISR assets, thus simplifying both air and ground defensive acquisition and fires from standoff.
-
But beyond rapid closure and JSEAD, against more capable threats such as in notional studies, history shows that the DoD and State Department can find allied nations and allied armed territories within an adversary nation. that are willing to accept and assist aerial and sea deployment. The rapid nature of such deployment by C-17 and JHSV will close substantial force to deter any thought an adjacent adversary might have to invade its neighbor. Protected ports become secure sites for sea deployment of heavier modular brigades and FCS logistical forces. Protected airheads offer alternate avenues of approach and divide adversary attention between multiple areas of concern.
----------------------------------------------------------------
MAJ Klein said: Another blow to the theory of aero-mechanized warfare is cost. At roughly $180 million each, the C-17 aircraft is too expensive and valuable as a strategic asset to be used in such operations. C-130s are similarly expensive, roughly $80 million to $85 million. Neither of these aircraft meets the requirements for vertical or supershort take-off and landing on austere surfaces as the Army’s FCS Concept requires. The cost of a new aircraft program requiring a multifaceted R&D component is potentially very large. The reality over the next fiscal decade is that the Army cannot afford such a program, nor should the other services be expected to foot the bill.
------------------------------------------------------------
A V-22 is $70 million yet the DoD was convinced that its sorties can be secured by other airpower. Again, it comes down to where you land and how much JSEAD and air dominance you can provide. Our allies will soon field the A400M capable of carrying FCS vehicles. We should consider purchasing some of our own, rather than continuing to poor money into a C-130J with too small a cabin and too light a payload.
-
Beyond that, the Marines are also financing expensive CH-53K aircraft with substantial lift that could assist Army airlift of other FCS equipment (not armor) and assist aerial resupply. But the Army and Joint force also needs a Joint Heavy Lift Rotorcraft (JHLR) capability to carry 30 tons. Aside from providing capability to airlift FCS armor, such a rotorcraft would excel at providing logistics support for offensive FCS ground movements. Such aircraft could theoretically lift up to 8.500 gallons of fuel or 60,000 lbs of internal and external load ammunition to link up with ground logistics vehicles well to the rear of forward FCS elements during their ground offensive. Two JHLR carrying 8,500 gallons of fuel would be required to support a tank-heavy battalion task force, with 30 Abrams and 14 Bradleys burning 17,800 gallons per fill-up. A single JHLR with 8,500 gallons would fully support filling up an FCS task force with 30 MCS with hybrid electric drives and 120 mm guns capable of firing 8+ km medium range munitions, and 16 ICVs holding more Infantry than the Bradley.
---------------------------------------------------------
MAJ Klein said: And even if we could afford such a program, would we really put these expensive systems in harm’s way against cheap systems available even to Third World nations? In light of these revelations, the Army needs to re-examine its Future Force Concept in which FCS-equipped forces will simply “leap over” enemy defenses.
---------------------------------------------------------
It doesn't need to leap over them. It leaps around them! That was on problem with the 11th AHR raid in OIF. The attack regiment was forced to take routes over occupied territory due to lack of fuel and ground control measures. Two days later, the 101st Airborne (AA) Division had much greater success by learning lessons from the previous raid and taking less risky routes with solid plans to suppress threats that were encountered.
-
Army aviators have been in harms ways for over 6 years and their losses to "cheap systems available to Third World Nations" have been low considering the numbers of hours flown. Marines fly large vulnerable V-22s at 8,000' to evade many threats, but they would no doubt prove highly survivable at lower altitudes against suppressed future radar air defenses, once freed from initial concerns about new aircraft in the public/Congressional eye. Studies always inflate air defense threats and discount the ingenuity of aviators and JSEAD spe******ts to find a way to survive and suppress. Recall that only 1 aircraft was actually downed in the 11th AHR raid and no pilot lives were lost en route. We will know better next time, just as the 101st knew better two days later.

MAJ Klein said: The Army seems to be on track with its current modularity. What will make FCS-equipped and modernized ground forces potent are netted command and control, a reduced logistics footprint and the ability to call on joint fires and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The Army should also examine cost-effective ways of improving our airborne forces, such as GPS-guided parafoil technology and enhancing protection mobility through robotics, active protection systems, compact transportation and deployable alternatives such as the Armored Security Vehicle.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Why do we always believe airborne forces can survive on C-130s flown at altitude but FCS forces aboard C-130/A400m/C-17s will not survive at equivalent altitudes. Both scenarios require extensive JSEAD and well thought out operational plans. That's your job in the J-7 shop. Heavy forces can survive being airlifted as well, as long as caution is exercised where and how you airland them. A Joint Heavy Lift Rotorcraft would create near-infinite options for LZs, located far enough from the threat to survive, yet close enough to move by ground to key centers of gravity….under the same airpower protection that suppresses enemy air defenses in the first place.
------------------------------------------------------------
MAJ Klein said: While the Army cannot afford to pursue the red herring of aero-mechanized warfare on a large scale, it should develop a limited capability to follow up airborne airfield seizure with company- and battalion-sized elements of Stryker and FCS. However, as Stryker’s employment in Iraq indicates, speed over land, and not via air, is and will remain the key to long-range autonomous operational maneuver.
-------------------------------------------------------
We agree completely that the smaller element intratheater air deployments make more sense. A full brigade will probably never see much intratheater air movement except perhaps during strategic air deployment close enough to facilitate ground movement that concerns the threat. Bashur was 250 miles from Baghdad. That's more than close enough, and conceivably one fuel load for FCS vehicles with Joint Heavy Lift Rotorcraft able to resupply a battalion task force as required.
-
Intratheater movement of a FCS/Stryker battalions or companies will allow options never before enjoyed with anything other than light forces. Extensive air assaults in Viet Nam, OIF, and OEF have shown that air assaults work. Air assaults involving armor would simply add a new dimension.
-
Once FCS is fielded, planners will have the vision to properly deploy these systems by air and sea, and then employ them effectively along multiple ground avenues of approach to serve as a magnet for threat forces that move toward them. The FCS force has the survivable armor and active protection to thwart that enemy counterattack and direct multiple joint fires to destroy any enemy identified as being close enough to endanger FCS elements.